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THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THY LORD’S NAME IN VEIN:
VACCINE MANDATES & RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS

Stephen Moran*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2020, the United States announced its first
laboratory-confirmed case of SARS-CoV-2 (“coronavirus” or
“COVID-19”). 1 As of August 2022, the United States reports more
than 91,585,521 confirmed coronavirus cases with 1,029,939
related deaths. 2 Despite the CDC’s recommendations that
everyone wear masks in public places, maintain six feet of distance
between one another, and wash their hands more frequently, 3 our
nation has suffered through five waves of coronavirus infection
rates. 4
The coronavirus is far from our nation’s first bout with
infectious disease. Smallpox came to North America in the 1600s;
however, after a large vaccination initiative in 1972, smallpox is

*J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2022; B.A., Justice Studies,
Montclair State University, 2016. Before we begin, I would like to take the time to
recognize a few people. First, and most importantly, my family—without your love
and continued support, none of my life’s achievements would have been possible.
Next, my friends—you have always seen potential in me, and for that, I am forever
grateful. Finally, my adviser, Professor Angela Carmella—your guidance throughout
this process has been invaluable. Thank you, all.
1
Erin K. Stokes et al., Coronavirus Disease 2019 Case Surveillance—United
States, January 22–May 30, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORALITY WKLY. REP. 759, 760
n.††† (June 19, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6924e2H.pdf.
2
Tracking the Spread of the Coronavirus Outbreak in the U.S., BLOOMBERG
(April 25, 2022, 2:31 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-unitedstates-coronavirus-outbreak/.
3 How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/
prevention.html.
4
See Arielle Dreher, The Fifth Wave of the Coronavirus Pandemic has
Arrived
in
Washington ,
SPOKESMAN -R EV.
(July 23,
2021),
https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2021/jul/23/welcome-to-the-fifth-wave/.
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now eradicated in the United States. 5 In 1921, diphtheria peaked
with around 206,000 cases. 6 Now, more than eighty percent of
children in the United States are vaccinated against the bacteria. 7
Throughout the 1950s, there were two major polio outbreaks in
the U.S., with 57,628 reported cases in 1952; 8 a vaccine was
approved and quickly adopted throughout the world and, by 1962,
the number of cases dropped to 910.9 From 1981–1991, the U.S.
endured a second measles outbreak, and almost all children
caught measles prior to the vaccine.10 In the second half of the
twentieth century, however, most measles cases were due to
inadequate vaccination coverage.11 Doctors began recommending
a second dose of the measles vaccine for everyone and, since then,
the U.S. typically reports fewer than 1,000 cases each year. 12 In
2009, the H1N1 virus—commonly known as “swine flu”—spread
quickly across the United States. 13 The CDC estimates that there
were over 60.8 million cases but, in late December 2009, the H1N1
vaccine became available and virus activity levels began to slow. 14
The success of vaccines is undisputed.
Almost a year into America’s battle with the coronavirus—on
December 11, 2020—the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) issued an emergency use authorization of the PfizerBioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine, which allowed the U.S. to begin
distribution. 15 Since then, the FDA has fully approved two COVID19 vaccines—Pfizer and Moderna—with the Johnson & Johnson
vaccine also available for use in the U.S.16 These vaccines seem to
5
Dana Robinson & Ann Battenfield, The Worst Outbreaks in U.S. History,
HEALTHLINE
(May 24,
2020)
[hereinafter
Robinson
&
Battenfield],
https://www.healthline.com/health/worst-disease-outbreaks-history.
6 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
7 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
8 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
9 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
10 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
11 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
12 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
13 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
14 Robinson & Battenfield, supra note 5.
15
COVID-19 Vaccines: Pfizer-BioNTech, AMERICAN MED. ASS’N,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/public-health/covid-19-vaccinespfizer-biontech (last visited April 24, 2022).
16 Alyssa Billingsley, FDA COVID-19 Vaccine Approval: Live Updates on Pfizer,
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be America’s coup de grâce in the hunt for a return to normalcy,
which is only achieved by herd immunity. Herd immunity is when
an “overwhelming majority” of the population develops some
form of immunity to a disease, making the spread from person to
person less likely.17 Further, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) suggests that the safest—and most effective—means of
achieving herd immunity against COVID-19 is through
vaccination, rather than exposing individuals to the pathogen that
causes the underlying disease. 18
Despite the potential benefits accompanying a rapid vaccine
rollout, a 2020 tracking survey conducted by Gallup found that
thirty-five percent of Americans would decline a free, FDAapproved vaccine.19 This “anti-vaxxer” phenomenon seriously
frustrates the nation’s goal of achieving herd immunity against
COVID-19, jeopardizing the seventy to ninety percent of the
population that experts say is necessary to become immunized to
prevent future outbreaks. 20 This Comment, however, focuses on
another potential frustration in the pursuit of herd immunity—
religious objections to a COVID-19 vaccination raised under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 21
This Comment will discuss the potential for compulsory
vaccination measures, on both the state and federal level, and
examines Free Exercise jurisprudence against the backdrop of
Moderna, and J&J Vaccines, GOODRX (Apr. 1, 2022), https://www.goodrx.com/

conditions/covid-19/fda-covid-19-vaccine-approval-updates.
17 See Thomas Buckley, Fighting Anti-Vaccine Pseudoscience, One Viral Video
at a Time, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020zdoggmd-covid-antivaxxers/?sref=voktyKaT.

18 Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Herd Immunity, Lockdowns and COVID19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-

detail/herd-immunity-lockdowns-and-covid-19.
19 Shannon Mullen O’Keefe, One in Three Americans Would Not Get COVID19 Vaccine, GALLUP (Aug. 7, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317018/one-threeamericans-not-covid-vaccine.aspx.
20 See David G. Hill, From the Frontlines: Understanding Herd Immunity, AM.
LUNG ASS’N: EACH BREATH (July 27, 2020), https://www.lung.org/blog/understandingcovid-herd-immunity#:~:text=In%20most%20cases%2C%20herd,lasting%20
immunity%20is%20possible; see also US Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker, USA FACTS
(Apr. 17,
2022),
https://usafacts.org/visualizations/covid-vaccine-tracker-states/
(finding that 66 percent of the population is considered “fully vaccinated.”).
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise” of religion.).
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public health laws. Part II of this Comment addresses the
frustrations that the anti-vaxxer movement imposes on public
health laws and raises questions concerning the sincerity of many
claims for religious exemption. Part III suggests compulsory
vaccination legislation as a means to combat the anti-vaxxer
movement. It further provides a brief history of the states’ police
power to enact public health laws, and, on the federal level, it
addresses the Executive and Legislative branches’ ability to enact
the proposed mandate, focusing on Congress’ enumerated powers
as potential avenues. Part IV examines Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence and outlines the significance of the Court’s decision
in Employment Division v. Smith . 22 Part V acknowledges the
necessity of including a secular exemption for medical
contraindication in any vaccine legislation and explores whether
that fact requires Congress to also carve out an exemption for
religious purposes. It goes on to argue in favor of rational basis
review for adjudicating Free Exercise challenges brought against
public health laws.
This Comment only aims to introduce the possibility of a
vaccine mandate—on either the state or federal level—and
discusses the legal implications of Free Exercise challenges to
public health laws, generally. Although a definitive finding of the
constitutionality of a vaccine mandate is beyond the scope of this
Comment, this area of law is ripe for further research and analysis.
II.

COVID-19 & THE “ANTI-VAXXER” PROBLEM

“Anti-vaxxers” are individuals who actively oppose
widespread vaccination. 23 Scholarly profiles of such individuals
suggest that many identify with the “anti-vaccine” label to feel a
sense of belonging in a broader community.24 This problematic
phenomenon is known as anti-vaxx social identification, which
often leads to increased receptivity to vaccine misinformation and
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Matt Motta et al., Identifying the Prevalence, Correlates, and Policy
Consequences of Anti-Vaccine Social Identity, ROUTLEGE: TAYLOR & FRANCIS GRP.:
POLITICS, GRPS, & IDENTITIES, at 1 (May 30, 2021), https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/21565503.2021.1932528 (finding that about twenty-two percent of
Americans self-identify as “anti-vaxxers”).
24 Id. at 1–2.
22
23
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resistance to evidence-based medicine.25 For many on the political
right, “opposing COVID-19 vaccinations has become a matter of
political identity.” 26
Given the large anti-vaccine movement in the U.S., “there is
evidence that many claims of religious objections to vaccination
are false.” 27 While these objectors may sincerely object to
vaccination, their reasoning is not based on religion.28
In fact, law professor Dorit Rubinstein Reiss compiled
anecdotal and survey evidence that suggests that a majority of
religion-based claims for refusing school vaccination requirements
are false. 29 Given the current format of religious exemptions,
however, it is easily abused in ways that undermine states’ goals of
public health. 30 A recent study of school-entry vaccination
exemptions across the nation outlines this abuse and the
correlated frustration of public health goals. 31 In analyzing CDC
data on vaccination exemptions for children entering
kindergarten from 2011 to 2018, the study found that “[s]tates
with religious and personal belief exemptions were one-fourth as
likely to have kindergartners with religious exemptions as states
with religious exemptions only.” 32 The study concluded that
religious exemption rates are directly correlated with the
availability of personal belief exemptions, with religious
exemption claims acting as a “replacement” for personal belief
exemptions. 33

Id. at 2.
Douglas Laycock, What’s the Law on Vaccine Exemptions? A Religious Liberty
Expert Explains, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 15, 2021, 8:15 AM EDT),
https://theconversation.com/whats-the-law-on-vaccine-exemptions-a-religiousliberty-expert-explains-166934 [hereinafter Laycock].
25
26

27
28

Id.
Id.

29 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God
in Vain: Use and Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immunization
Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 1551, 1553 (2014).
30 Id.
31
See Joshua T.B. Williams et al., Religious Vaccine Exemptions in
Kindergartners:
2011-2018,
144
PEDIATRICS
1,
2
(Dec.
2019),

http://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article-pdf/144/6/e20192710/1078615/peds_
20192710.pdf.
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id. at 5.
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Moreover, Facebook, with its over 1.2 billion users, provides
a forum for anti-vaccine activists to share advice about obtaining
exemptions from school immunization requirements. 34 For
example, in response to a request for advice on how to obtain a
vaccination exemption for her child, one online commentator
said: “She is going to have to lie. If you give any vaccine even 1
shot [sic] they say it can’t be religious beliefs. I had to do a bit of
Photoshop work to make the records say they have NEVER had
any shots.” 35
Further, it is difficult for judges to determine the sincerity of
religious claims, and they usually do not try. 36 The Court’s robust
deference to religious claims in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 37
however, further invited questionable religious objections to public
health laws. There, the petitioner-employer’s religious exemption
claim relied on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”)—an Act reinstating the pre-Smith “compelling interest”
standard—alleging that it protected the close corporation from
having to pay healthcare coverage for contraceptives that its
owners believed were abortifacients when, in fact, they were not. 38
Ultimately, the Court found in favor of the petitioner-employer,
finding that the regulation imposed a substantial burden on their
“exercise of religion,” in violation of RFRA. 39

Rubinstein Reiss, supra note 29, at 1553 (citation omitted).
Rubinstein Reiss, supra note 29, at 1553 (citation omitted).
36 Laycock, supra note 26.
37 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see discussion infra pp. 27–29; see also Christopher T.
Robertson, Vaccines and Airline Travel: A Federal Role to Protect the Public Health,
42 AM. J. L. & MED 543, 569 (2016) [hereinafter Robertson] (“the ruling casts a
shadow over all public health regulation, given that virtually any objector can cloak
their objection in religious garb.”); Marci A. Hamilton, The Biggest Threat to Herd
34
35

Immunity Against COVID-19 May Be the Religious Freedom Restoration Act(s) and
State Religious Exemptions, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Aug. 25, 2020) [hereinafter Hamilton,
The Biggest Threat to Herd Immunity], https://verdict.justia.com/2020/08/25/the-

biggest-threat-to-herd-immunity-against-covid-19-may-be-the-religious-freedomrestoration-acts-and-state-religious-exemptions (“The Hobby Lobby decision also
cast in doubt how robustly federal courts can question the sincerity of religious liberty
claims, so expect innovation religious claims from anti-vaxxers against the COVID19 vaccine, whether or not their objection is religious.”).
38 Hamilton, The Biggest Threat to Herd Immunity, supra note 37.
39 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726.
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Critics of the Hobby Lobby decision express concern over the
precedent, arguing that it renders future courts powerless to block
insincere claims of religious exemptions made by corporations
“seeking to evade generally applicable laws.” 40 In light of the
Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 41 RFRA’s scope is
confined to laws enacted by the federal government. 42 The Court’s
narrowing in Boerne, however, proves insignificant as “roughly
half of the states have a statute patterned on the federal RFRA that
creates ‘super rights’ against any state law.” 43
The above factors invite a flood of false religious claims;
however, not all claims are insincere, per se. Some Catholics object
to COVID-19 vaccination because “decades-old fetal cell lines were
used in the vaccine research,” 44 although Pope Francis disagrees. 45
In fact, most religions either do not prohibit or are explicitly in
support of vaccination. 46 Still, even when religious objections are
truly sincere, “the government has a compelling interest in
overriding them and insisting that everyone be vaccinated.” 47
In February 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 48 leading many to anticipate the law
of exemptions to change dramatically. 49 There, petitioners sought
to either: (1) overrule Employment Division v. Smith, which
established that the Free Exercise Clause does not provide a
religious exemption from neutral laws of general applicability; or
(2) limit the impact of Smith by interpreting it as guaranteeing a
Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Question Sincerity: The Role of the Courts
After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59, 59 (2014).
40

521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See discussion infra pp. 25–26.
43 Hamilton, The Biggest Threat to Herd Immunity, supra note 37.
44 Laycock, supra note 26.
45
See Ad Council, Unity Across the Americas: COVID-19 Vaccine Education,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zY5rwTnJF0U
(describing receipt of an approved COVID-19 vaccine as “an act of love.”).
46 Rubinstein Reiss, supra note 29, at 1569–82 (stating that Judaism, Islam and
Christianity (specifically Catholics, Methodists, Lutherans, Mormons, Episcopalians
and Presbyterians) actually support vaccinations).
47 Laycock, supra note 26.
48
922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021); see
discussion infra pp. 37–40.
49
VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10551, SUPREME COURT
CONSIDERS OVERRULING FREE EXERCISE PRECEDENT IN FULTON V. PHILADELPHIA 1
(Nov. 9, 2020).
41
42
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“most favored nation” status for claims of religious exemption. 50
With the validity of thirty years of precedent hanging in the
balance, Fulton had the potential to reshape the Free Exercise
landscape in a way that abandoned the common good for specific
religious agendas. 51 The Court instead, however, chose to rule in
favor of the religious objector on narrow, fact-specific grounds, in
what can only be considered a “near miss”—portending a
revolution soon to come. 52
According to Dr. Anthony Fauci, the nation’s leading
infectious disease expert, COVID-19 is “the most disastrous
pandemic that we have experienced in our civilization.” 53 In our
nation’s three-year battle with coronavirus, two variants of the virus
emerged—Delta and Omicron—which spread more easily from
person to person.54 Moreover, infectious disease experts are
already focused on preventing the next pandemic, one that may
be far more lethal, with the potential to “change the trajectory of
life on the planet.” 55 It is now, while we have the attention of our
nation’s politicians, that we must begin to consider our approach
to future public health crises.

50
Jim Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder: The Most Important Free
Exercise Decision Since 1990, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2021, 10:13 AM),

https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/04/tandon-steals-fultons-thunder-the-mostimportant-free-exercise-decision-since-1990/ [hereinafter Oleske, Tandon Steals
Fulton’s Thunder].
51 Leslie C. Griffin & Marci A. Hamilton, Why We Like Smith: We Want Neutral
and General Laws to Prevent Harm, JUSTIA:VERDICT (Apr. 20, 2021), https://verdictjustia-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/verdict.justia.com/amp/2021/04/20/why-we-likesmith-we-want-neutral-and-general-laws-to-prevent-harm.
52 Elizabeth Sepper & James D. Nelson, Fulton v. Philadelphia: A Masterpiece
of an Opinion?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June 18, 2021), https://www.acslaw.org/
expertforum/fulton-v-philadelphia-a-masterpiece-of-an-opinion/.
53 Marie Rosenthal, Fauci: COVID-19 Worst Pandemic in 100 Years, INFECTIOUS
DISEASE SPECIAL EDITION (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.idse.net/Covid-19/Article/1020/Fauci--COVID-19-Worst-Pandemic-in-100-Years/60937.
54
What You Need to Know About Variants, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants
/about-variants.html.
55
Jim Robbins, Heading Off the Next Pandemic, MEDSCAPE (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/943517 (discussing the Nipah virus, which has
a mortality rate as high as 75 percent).
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THE VACCINE MANDATE SOLUTION

The government, however, is not powerless in the pursuit of
finality from the COVID-19 pandemic. A potential legal tool at
the government’s disposal in reaching herd immunity vaccination
levels is to require them. 56 In fact, the idea of compulsory
vaccination finds support from the New York State Bar
Association, which passed a resolution in 2020 encouraging the
State to mandate that all New Yorkers undergo COVID-19
vaccination when one became available. 57 The resolution urged
the state to not include exemptions for “religious, philosophical or
personal reasons,” recognizing that a person’s health “can and
does affect others.” 58 While the resolution related solely to
residents of the State of New York, the Bar Association’s Health
Law Section initially recommended that it should be mandatory
for all Americans to undergo COVID-19 vaccination, with the only
exception being “doctor-ordered medical reasons.” 59
Under the United States’ system of federalism,60 the states and
the federal government both play a role in regulating matters of
public health. 61 The states, pursuant to their general police
powers,62 have traditionally exercised a majority of authority in the
realm of public health. 63 By contrast, the powers delegated to the
KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46399, LEGAL ISSUES IN COVID19 VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT 25 (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46399 [hereinafter HICKEY ET AL.].
57
Jason Grant, State Bar Passes Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination
Recommendation, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 7, 2020, 5:28 PM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2020/11/07/state-bar-passes-mandatory-covid-19-vaccinationrecommendation/.
56

58
59
60

Id.
Id.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“[O]ur Constitution

establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government.”); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“States possess
sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to
limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”).
61 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 25; see also United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (upholding an act of Congress which prohibited the
interstate shipment of “Milnut” because it was injurious to public health).
62 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (defining the police power
of the states as “the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals” of
their citizens).
63 See HICKEY AT AL., supra note 56, at 25.
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federal government are “few and defined,” 64 limiting Congress’
ability to those powers enumerated by the Constitution. 65
A. State Power
The states’ police power to govern matters of public health
has been understood as encompassing the authority to mandate
vaccination for their inhabitants. 66 The Supreme Court first
addressed this issue in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, where a
compulsory smallpox vaccination was upheld as a valid exercise of
police power in regulating “for the protection of the public health
and the public safety, confessedly endangered by the presence of
a dangerous disease.” 67 There, a smallpox outbreak was “prevalent
and increasing” in the city of Cambridge.68 At the time,
Massachusetts law allowed for the board of health of a city or town
to enforce the vaccination of all inhabitants over twenty-one years
of age, upon a determination that public health and safety
required such action. 69 There, the plaintiff argued that such a
program violated his liberty interests which, under modern
jurisprudence, is equivalent to a substantive due process claim. 70
Alternatively, the plaintiff alleged a violation of equal protection
of the law, as applied to adults, because the statute allowed for
exemptions in favor of children. 71 In upholding the law, the Court
applied rational basis review, finding that the Massachusetts
statute was enacted as a valid health measure and had a “real and
substantial relation” to that objective. 72
In the years following the Jacobson decision, courts have
routinely rejected Due Process and Equal Protection claims against
vaccine mandates, granting considerable deference to the states in
64
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which
are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”).
65 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405
(1819) (stating that the federal government is “one of enumerated powers.”).
66 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 26; see also HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 26.
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30.
See id. at 31.
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protecting public health. 73 In Zucht v. King, the Supreme Court
addressed a San Antonio city ordinance which required children
to present a certificate of vaccination to attend a place of
education. 74
Relying on Jacobson, the Court upheld the
requirement, finding that the school-immunization ordinance was
“required for the protection of the public health.” 75
While both Zucht and Jacobson were Due Process and Equal
Protection challenges, 76 courts continue to rely on them when
adjudicating Free Exercise challenges to vaccination mandates—
consistently rejecting such claims in favor of broad state police
power. 77
Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted the significant
interconnection between Free Exercise claims and Equal
Protection claims in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 78 writing, “[i]n determining if the object of a law is a
neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find
guidance in our equal protection cases.” 79
In 2020, the Supreme Court twice denied applications for
emergency injunctive relief, heard on the Court’s “shadow
docket,” 80 for Free Exercise challenges brought by houses of
worship, effectively allowing states to place harsher COVID-19
restrictions on indoor religious gatherings than on certain indoor
secular gatherings. 81 The first case was South Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newson, where the Court upheld a
73 See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Phillips v. City of New York, 775
F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015); Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348
(4th Cir. 2011); Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2016); Boone
v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2020).
74 Zucht, 260 U.S. at 175.
75 Id. at 177.
76 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 26, 31.
77 See, e.g., Phillips, 775 F.3d 538; Workman, 419 F. App’x 348 ; Whitlow, 203
F. Supp. 3d 1079; Boone, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938.
78 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
79 Id. at 540.
80
“Shadow docket” is the informal term for emergency rulings that the Court
issues, usually handed down in short opinions, without full briefing or oral argument.
Ellena Erskine, Senators Spar Over Shadow Docket in Wake of Court’s Order
Allowing Texas Abortion Law to Take Effect, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 29, 2021, 8:20 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/09/senators-spar-over-shadow-docket-in-wake-ofcourts-order-allowing-texas-abortion-law-to-take-effect/.
81
See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(2020); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020).
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California safety guideline that placed a twenty-five percent
building capacity or one hundred-person occupancy limit on
religious services—a limit which was not imposed on “dissimilar
activities,” such as supermarkets and retail stores. 82 In his
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts stressed the importance of
entrusting “the safety and the health of the people” during
“extraordinary health emergenc[ies]” to those “politically
accountable,” rather than subjecting public health laws to “secondguessing” by the judiciary. 83
Subsequently, in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, the
Court again chose not to grant injunctive relief to a church on its
Free Exercise challenge, stemming from a Nevada regulation that
placed a fifty-person occupancy cap on religious services. 84 By
contrast, secular indoor gatherings, such as casinos, were
permitted to admit fifty percent of their maximum occupancy,
which—in the case of Las Vegas casinos—meant “thousands of
patrons.” 85 Both of these 5-4 rulings were accompanied by sharp
dissents from the conservative members of the Court. 86
Following the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
September 2020, the Senate confirmed Justice Amy Coney Barrett
to the bench, solidifying a 6-3 conservative majority on the
Supreme Court. 87 Given the new composition of the Court, the
broad discretion traditionally afforded to the states in enacting
public health regulations in times of emergency is no longer on
such firm footing. For example, in Roman Catholic Diocese v.
Cuomo, 88 Justice Amy Coney Barrett—new to the Court—joined
the four conservative justices who dissented in Newson and Sisolak
to form the majority. 89 In another 5-4 decision, this time in favor
of the conservative majority, the Court held that Governor
82
83
84
85
86
87

of

140 S. Ct. at 1613.
Id. at 1613–14 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
140 S. Ct. at 2604.

Id.
See S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1614; see also Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2603.
Steven T. Dennis, Barrett Confirmation Hands Win to Trump, GOP on Even
Election,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
26,
2020,
11:37
PM
EDT),

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-27/senate-confirms-barrett-forsupreme-court?sref=voktyKaT.
88 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
89

Id.

MORAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

9/5/2022 11:47 AM

COMMENT

747

Cuomo’s Executive Order, which restricted attendance at religious
services in areas classified as “red” and “orange” zones, violated
the Free Exercise Clause because it ran afoul of “the minimum
requirement of neutrality” toward religion. 90 The Executive Order
in that case adopted a categorization method where “red” and
“orange” zones were established in order to prevent the spread of
COVID-19. 91 For instance, in an “orange” zone, a place of worship
was limited to twenty-five persons, while “non-essential” businesses
were left to decide for themselves how many people to admit. 92
While this case seemed like a straightforward application of the
modern Free Exercise doctrine, it also indicated a shift in the
amount of deference the Court is willing to grant states in enacting
public health laws that incidentally burden religion. 93
Aside from the apparent shift in deference, practical concerns
also accompany state-centric responses to public health crises.
Divergence in state policy is not a new concept; however, pandemic
policy is much different than policies regarding education or law
enforcement. 94 For one, there is an inherent lack of uniformity,
especially in leaving vaccine requirements to state discretion. One
state’s decision to enforce robust vaccination laws is undermined
by unvaccinated individuals regularly crossing its borders from out
of state. 95
The lack of uniformity among the states is exemplified by
their varying responses, and the regulations enacted, in
attempting to slow the spread of the coronavirus.96 Such
divergence creates pressures on federalism. 97
With states
90
91
92
93

Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 67 (“Stemming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a

compelling interest, but it is hard to see how the challenged regulations can be
regarded as ‘narrowly tailored.’”).
94
Tyler Cowen, Coronavirus Hands More Power to New York, California and
BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 16,
2020,
4:04
PM
EDT),
Other
States,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-14/coronavirus-could-bringamerica-all-the-way-back-to-1781?sref=voktyKaT.
95
Robertson, supra note 37, at 545; see also Robertson, supra note 25, at 550
(discussing data that shows a direct correlation between the volume of travel and the
rate at which influenza viruses spread).
96 Cowen, supra note 94.
97 Cowen, supra note 94.
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“reopening” following COVID-19 regulations, however, three
groups of governors pledged to work together in coordinating
their pandemic relief policies. 98 One such governor, Tim Walz—
governor of Minnesota—criticized the nation’s current approach,
comparing it to “a loose Articles of Confederation.” 99 “Crises tend
to widen fault lines that already exist,” 100 and the same problems
raised under the Articles of Confederation, friction between the
many states, is still at issue today. 101
One example of that friction occurred in Rhode Island, where
state police delayed cars with New York state license plates from
entering their borders due to New York’s high infection rates. 102
Rhode Island even went as far as acquiring the help of the National
Guard in conducting house-to-house searches, attempting to find
individuals who traveled from New York to “demand 14 days of
self-quarantine.” 103
In recognition of the flaws of such a disjointed approach,
public health experts warn against the potential dangers of strict
adherence to conceptions of federalism in response to public
health crises.104 The current approach of the many states is
counterintuitive to Justice Cardozo’s cardinal principle of the
Constitution, that “the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation
are in union and not division.”105

Mihir Sharma, Coronavirus is Straining the Concept of Federalism,
BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2020, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2020-05-03/coronavirus-crisis-is-straining-the-concept-offederalism?sref=voktyKaT (stating that governors in the West, Midwest, and East
have decided to coordinate pandemic response policy within each region).
98

99
100

Id.
Id.

101 Martin Kelly, Why the Articles of Confederation Failed, THOUGHTCO (May 8,
2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/why-articles-of-confederation-failed-104674.
102
Cowen, supra note 94; Prashant Gopal & Brian K. Sullivan, Rhode Island
Police to Hunt Down New Yorkers Seeking Refuge, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2020, 5:14
PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-27/rhode-island-police
-to-hunt-down-new-yorkers-seeking-refuge?sref=voktyKaT (stating that “New York
is the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak in the U.S.”).
103 Gopal & Sullivan, supra note 102.
104 Robertson, supra note 37, at 545.
105 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
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Effective public health laws are further frustrated, however,
when it comes to vaccination exemptions. A majority of states
“explicitly authorize religious exemptions to vaccination, and
sometimes philosophical exemptions as well—regardless of the
government’s compelling interests.” 106 A potential solution is for
the federal government to claim core public health functions, as
those state exemptions only “protect people from mandates from
their state or local government” and not against a federal vaccine
mandate. 107
B. Federal Power
The FDA has approved safe and effective vaccines for a wide
array of highly contagious and dangerous diseases, which the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) recommend
for all citizens. 108 The CDC declared vaccinations to be “one of the
10 great public health achievements of the twentieth century.” 109
Due to insufficient vaccination rates, however, approximately
42,000 Americans die each year from vaccine-preventable
diseases. 110 Science tells us that, when it comes to life-threatening
diseases, morbidity and mortality rates are dependent on human
behavior. 111 Without high levels of vaccination, infectious diseases
remain a significant threat to our civil society. 112 While many
vaccine mandates are in the context of immunization
requirements for school children, adult vaccination at the federal
level may become increasingly important in dealing with the next,
potentially deadlier, pandemic. 113
Although public health matters, including vaccination, are
traditionally in the purview of state authority—by way of their
broad police powers—there are three potential sources of such
Laycock, supra note 26.
Laycock, supra note 26.
108
Robertson, supra note 37, at 544 (discussing the eradication of smallpox,
polio, diphtheria, measles, mumps, and pertussis).
109 Kevin Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health
Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 262, 262
(Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
110 Robertson, supra note 37, at 544.
111 Robertson, supra note 37, at 544.
112 Robertson, supra note 37, at 544.
113 Robertson, supra note 37, at 544–45.
106
107
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power at the federal level. 114
1. The Executive Branch
Except in limited circumstances, 115 no existing federal law
expressly imposes a vaccination requirement on the general
public. 116 The Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”), however,
provides a potential avenue for the executive branch to enact such
a vaccination requirement. 117 PHSA empowers the Surgeon
General to “make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment
are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread
of communicable diseases” from “one State . . . into any other
State.” 118 This provision has been described as “broad [and]
flexible,” 119 and a broad construction may permit the CDC to
require vaccination to prevent the interstate transmission of the
coronavirus.120
Section 361 of PHSA however, provides that “[f]or purposes
of carrying and enforcing such regulations,” the CDC “may
provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation,
pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be
so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection
to human beings, and other measures, as in [its] judgment may be
necessary.” 121 The remaining subsections of PHSA pertain to the
issuance of regulations related to the apprehension, detention,
and examination of individuals “believed to be infected with a
communicable disease.” 122 Given the language of the Act—when
read as a whole—regulations pursuant to it have been confined to
114
See generally HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 28–31 (discussing state and
federal authority to mandate vaccination).
115
HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 28 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A) (stating
that the limited circumstances include immigration and military contexts); DEP’T OF
DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION 6205.02, DOD IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM 3 (July 23, 2019),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/620502p.pdf?ver
= 2019-07-23-085404-617).
116 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 28.
117 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2021).
118
119
120
121
122

Id.

Louisiana v. Matthews, 427 F. Supp. 174, 176 (E.D. La. 1977).
HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 28.
42 U.S.C. § 264(a).
See id. § 264(b)–(d).
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the quarantine of goods and people, and measures to control or
treat animals subject to contamination. 123 In light of its narrow
application, it is doubtful that the authority granted to the CDC by
PHSA provides an adequate vehicle for a federal vaccination
mandate. 124
2. The Legislative Branch
As discussed, Congress shares concurrent authority with the
states when dealing with matters of public health, with Congress’
authority confined to those enumerated powers established by the
Constitution. 125 In particular, the Constitution’s Spending Clause
and the Commerce Clause are two provisions with the potential
for Congress to draw on in enacting a federal vaccine mandate. 126
i. The Spending Clause
The Spending Clause empowers Congress to “provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” 127
Stemming from this power is Congress’ ability to attach conditions
on the receipt of federal funds “to further broad policy
objectives.” 128 In practice, Congress has invoked this authority to
further broad public health initiatives, including for purposes of
“controlling specified diseases, establishing neighborhood or
community health centers, and creating federal health insurance
programs, including Medicare and Medicaid.” 129 Under current
precedent, it may be possible for Congress to condition the receipt
of certain federal funds on state enactment of a vaccination
mandate that complies with specified federal requirements. 130
HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 29.
HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 29.
125 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 29; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
126 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 29; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–3.
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
128 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474
(1980)).
129 See HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 29 (citing James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role
of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 309, 335–337 (1998)).
130
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12 (holding that 23 U.S.C. § 158, which
conditioned the provision of certain federal highway funds upon a state’s enactment
of a minimum drink age of twenty-one, was a valid exercise of Congress’ Spending
Clause authority).
123
124
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Assuming that a federal vaccination mandate—issued during a
global pandemic—would qualify as providing for the “general
welfare,” 131 the mandate would be permissible, so long as it meets
the requirements established in South Dakota v. Dole:
(1) Congress provides clear notice of the vaccination
mandate that states must enact; (2) the mandate is
related to the purpose of the federal funds; (3) this
conditional grant of funds is not otherwise barred by
the Constitution; and (4) the amount of federal
funds offered is not “so coercive as to pass the point
at which pressure turns into compulsion.” 132
Spending Clause precedent, however, indicates that it may
not be the most effective of Congress’ enumerated powers to
achieve herd immunity. Specifically, the fourth prong of the Dole
test, that the funds must not be “so coercive as to pass the point at
which pressure turns into compulsion,” 133 requires that states have
a “legitimate choice” in deciding whether to enact such a vaccine
mandate. 134
ii. The Commerce Clause
Congress’ commerce power is another potential—possibly
more effective—means of effectuating a widespread vaccination
mandate. 135 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 136 The Supreme Court has
identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under this power: (1) “the channels of interstate
131
See generally United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (discussing the
breadth of the phrase for the “general welfare.”).; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (“In
considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public
purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.”).
132 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 30 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08, 211).
133 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (internal quotations omitted).
134 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (finding
that “the financial inducement Congress ha[d] chosen [was] much more than
‘relatively mild encouragement’—it [was] a gun to the head.”).
135 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
136

Id.
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commerce,” such as roads, canals, airways; (2) “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce;” and (3) “those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce, those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.” 137 Congress has relied on this power
to enact comprehensive public health regulations in the past. 138
While Congress’ commerce authority is expansive, the
Supreme Court reeled in some of that power in National Federal
of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius.139 There, in a portion
of the opinion not joined by other justices, 140 Chief Justice Roberts
explained that the Commerce Clause does not permit Congress to
“regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing.” 141
With this, Sebelius created a substantial limit to the commerce
power—it must be used to regulate “commercial activity,” rather
than “compel[] individuals to become active in commerce.” 142
Further, the Sebelius decision suggests that a federal vaccine
mandate imposed directly on individuals may be construed as
unconstitutionally compelling individuals to engage in the
“commercial activity” of receiving a particularized health care
service.143 Fewer constitutional concerns would arise, however, if
the government were to require vaccination as a condition to
engage in an already-existing economic market, such as
employment. 144 Many health care workers—and other employees
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (“Despite the
prominence of the States in matters of public health and safety, in recent decades the
Federal Government has played an increasingly significant role in the protection of
the health of our people.”); see also Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301–399i (2018).
139 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
140
HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 30 (alluding to the fact that a lack of a
majority in this portion of the opinion creates uncertainty as to whether this
conclusion constitutes binding precedent).
141 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 520.
142 Id. at 550.
143 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 30.
144
See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 93 (4th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a
Commerce Clause challenge to an Affordable Care Act provision that requires certain
employers to offer a minimum level of health insurance coverage to their employees
on the grounds that the requirement merely regulates an existing commercial
activity). Recent efforts by the Biden administration to mandate vaccination for all
federal employees and subcontractors doing business with the federal government
137
138
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at great risk of contracting vaccine-preventable diseases—are
already required to become vaccinated against the flu by their
employers.145
Moreover, the coronavirus does not respect jurisdictional
boundaries. A person with a contagious disease can travel virtually
anywhere in the world within twenty-four hours. 146 In fact, travel is
directly correlated to the rate at which contagious disease spreads
throughout the United States. 147 For example, in 2015, a single
outbreak of measles at Disneyland spread throughout the nation
by travelers, leading to 189 cases of infection, spanning twentyfour states. 148 This problem is compounded by the fact that
approximately two million people use U.S. airlines to travel,
daily. 149 In recognition of the danger posed by allowing travel
without first becoming vaccinated, Congress could potentially
make vaccination screening a prerequisite to flying, which would
have secondary benefits on public health, generally. 150 Under
Supreme Court precedent, Congress’ commerce power already
encompasses the ability to regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, which includes
airplanes, the airways, and their passengers.151 Importantly, a
vaccine prerequisite for use of U.S. airlines is on stronger
constitutional footing than an individual requirement because it
would only apply to individuals already engaged in economic
activity—the act of purchasing an airline ticket. 152

are outside the scope of this Comment. For more information regarding this topic,
see Nathaniel M. Glasser et al., President Biden’s Vaccination Mandates for Federal
Employees and Contractors Remain in Limbo, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 24, 2022),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/president-biden-s-vaccination-mandatesfederal-employees-and-contractors-remain.
145 Joanne Rosen, Can COVID-19 Vaccines Be Mandatory in the U.S. and Who
Decides?, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.jhsph.edu/covid-19/articles/can-covid-19-vaccines-be-mandatory-in-theu-s-and-who-decides.html.
146 Robertson, supra note 37, at 550.
147 Robertson, supra note 37, at 550.
148 Robertson, supra note 37, at 550.
149 Robertson, supra note 37, at 545.
150 Robertson, supra note 37, at 551.
151 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
152 Robertson, supra note 37, at 567.
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Generally, the federal government has played a limited role
with respect to vaccination requirements, 153 but unprecedented
times call for unprecedented measures. If the coronavirus, or a
potentially deadlier virus, continues to have a stranglehold on the
nation, it may be necessary for Congress to address the issue by
implementing a vaccination mandate—and it will likely be
grounded in one of Congress’ enumerated powers described
above.
IV. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Assuming that either the states or the federal government
actually possess the power to enact a vaccine mandate, other
constitutional provisions—those establishing individual rights—
may frustrate such an action. 154 A particular area of concern
involves challenges brought under the Free Exercise Clause, which
applies equally to federal, state, and local governments. 155 As
discussed above, modern courts have systematically rejected Due
Process and Equal Protection challenges to compulsory
vaccination laws under Jacobson and Zucht . 156 Moreover, Free
Exercise challenges are limited by the Court’s precedent in
Employment Division v. Smith and its progeny. 157
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides
that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise”
of religion.158 For many years, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Free Exercise Clause as requiring religious exemptions for
neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burdened
religious activity and were not justified by a compelling
governmental interest. 159 In Sherbert v. Verner , the Court applied
153
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-13(a) (requiring private health insurance plans to
cover certain recommended immunizations); id. at § 1396s(a) (requiring coverage of
certain recommended pediatric vaccines under a state Medicaid plan).
154 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 31.
155
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the
Free Exercise Clause against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
156 HICKEY ET AL., supra note 56, at 31.
157 See discussion infra pp. 22–24 (discussing Smith, which held that neutral and
generally applicable laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause); HICKEY ET AL.,
supra note 56, at 31.
158 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
159
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963); Wisconsin v.
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this standard of strict scrutiny to a South Carolina law that
disqualified unemployment benefits for those who failed, “without
good cause,” to accept “suitable work when offered.” 160 There, the
plaintiff—a Seventh-day Adventist—was discharged by her
employer because her religion did not allow her to accept work on
Saturdays, the Sabbath day of her faith. 161 In ruling in favor of the
plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim, Justice Brennan wrote, “to
condition the availability of benefits upon this [plaintiff]’s
willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional
liberties.” 162 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that the
state’s asserted interest—a fear that insincere religious objections
would dilute unemployment compensation funds and hinder
employers in scheduling necessary Saturday work—failed to rise to
the level necessary to constitute a compelling government
interest. 163
In 1990, however, the Court handed down its landmark
decision in Smith. 164 There, an employer fired two Native
American employees after they ingested peyote for “sacramental
purposes;” the former employees were subsequently denied
unemployment compensation. 165
At the time, Oregon law
prohibited the “intentional possession of a controlled substance
unless the substance [was] prescribed by a medical practitioner.” 166
The employment division determined that the men were ineligible
for benefits because they were “discharged for work-related
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (“There are areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to
control, even under regulations of general applicability.”); see also Marci A.
Hamilton, In Defense of Justice Scalia on Religious Liberty and Smith, JUSTIA:
VERDICT (Feb. 18, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/02/18/in-defense-of-justicescalia-on-religious-liberty-and-smith [hereinafter Hamilton, In Defense of Justice
Scalia on Religious Liberty and Smith] (stating that the decision in Yoder “tragically
paved the way for religious communities to fail to educate their children, thereby
disabling them in an increasingly verbal, online society.”).
160 374 U.S. at 399–401, 406.
161 Id. at 399.
162 Id. at 406.
163 Id. at 407. Contra Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608–09 (1961) (finding
a governmental interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers).
164 Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
165 Id. at 874.
166

Id.
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misconduct”—i.e., the crime of ingesting a controlled substance. 167
Ultimately, the Court rejected the former employee’s Free
Exercise claim and, in doing so, established what would become
the standard for adjudicating Free Exercise challenges for years to
come: “[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” 168
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith was significant for many
reasons. First, the Smith decision was a dramatic departure from
how courts were handling Free Exercise disputes for nearly three
decades, establishing rational basis review as the governing
standard for neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally
burden religion—replacing Sherbert’s “compelling interest”
test. 169 Second, the opinion noted the potential “anarchy” that
accompanies the application of the “compelling interest” test for
such neutral laws, which can be read as a warning to future courts
in analyzing similar Free Exercise challenges. 170 Among this
anarchy, Justice Scalia described Sherbert’s standard as producing
“a private right to ignore generally applicable laws,” creating a
“constitutional anomaly.” 171 By making such a law contingent
upon the “coincidence” of alignment with the objectors’ religious
beliefs—Scalia believed—it permits the objector “to become a law
unto himself.” 172 The opinion further outlined the problem of
finding a “compelling interest” for every law that conflicts with a
religion in a society as diverse as ours and recognized that many
laws would likely fail under Sherbert’s demanding standard. 173 The
Smith decision essentially reiterated the notion that the United
States is a haven for believers, but also a place where believers do
not have a constitutional right to harm others,174 an idea first

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id.
Id. at 879 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 888.

Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).

Id. at 886.
Id. at 855 (citation omitted).
Id. at 888.
Hamilton, In Defense of Justice Scalia on Religious Liberty and Smith, supra

note 159.
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expressed by the Court in Reynolds v. United States. 175 Third,
Scalia was one of the most conservative members of the Court at
that time, and a devout Catholic, 176 so his shift on religious
exemptions in Smith shocked many other religious
conservatives. 177 Fourth, following Smith, the Coalition for the
Free Exercise of Religion advocated legislative action to overturn
the Court’s decision because of its “dramatic departure” from Free
Exercise jurisprudence, 178 ultimately resulting in Congress’
enactment of RFRA. 179 Finally—and most importantly—Scalia
read Sherbert as not wholly inconsistent with Smith. In dicta, the
opinion stated that Sherbert stood for the proposition that, where
the state creates a “mechanism for individualized exceptions,” it
may not refuse to extend that system to religious exceptions
without a compelling reason. 180

98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages
shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary
because of his religious belief? The permit this would be to make
the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself. Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances.
176 Elizabeth Dias, How Scalia’s Faith Reshaped the Supreme Court, TIME (Feb.
13, 2016, 8:23 PM), https://time.com/4220768/antonin-scalia-dead-catholic-legacy/.
177
Kelsey Dallas, How Justice Scalia Rules on Religious Freedom—and Why it
Matters, DESERT NEWS (Feb. 25, 2016, 12:20 PM), https://www.deseret.com
/2016/2/25/20583215/how-justice-scalia-ruled-on-religious-freedom-and-why-itmatters.
178 Hamilton, In Defense of Justice Scalia on Religious Liberty and Smith, supra
note 159.
179 42 U.S.C. § 2000bbb et seq. (2018).
180
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith., 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)
(citations omitted).
175
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NOT ALL EXEMPTIONS ARE CREATED EQUAL

A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
As stated, Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, 181 in an effort to “provide very
broad protection for religious liberty.” 182 Incorporated in the
congressional findings is the idea that even “neutral” laws “may
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere
with religious exercise,” and the Act’s purpose was to “restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert]” and its
progeny. 183 RFRA’s stringent “compelling interest” test essentially
amounts to strict scrutiny: “Government may substantially burden
a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 184 As
enacted in 1993, RFRA applied to both the federal government
and the states. 185 In justifying RFRA’s application against the states,
Congress relied on its enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, classifying the Act as a remedial
measure.186
In City of Boerne v. Flores, however, the Court held that
Congress exceeded its authority in enforcing RFRA against the
states. 187 In doing so, the Court explained that remedial measures
under the Fourteenth Amendment must have a “congruence and
proportionality” between the injury remedied and the means
adopted to that end. 188 If such a connection is lacking, the
legislation becomes an unconstitutional attempt at substantive
change in governing law. 189 The Court found that RFRA was a
congressional attempt to overrule the precedent set out in Smith
181
42 U.S.C. § 20000bb et seq.; see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U.S. 682, 694 (2014); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
182 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 693.
183 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)–(b).
184 Id. at § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added).
185 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
186 Id. at 530, 532.
187 Id. at 511.
188 Id. at 520.
189 Id. at 519–20.
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by creating a “substantive change in constitutional protections.” 190
“The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of
imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of
curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed
any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free
Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.” 191 The Boerne Court
went on to reaffirm the central holding of Smith, reasoning that
RFRA’s broad protection extended far beyond the constitutional
prohibition against laws motivated by religious bigotry. 192
Ultimately, the Court “invalidated RFRA only insofar as it applied
to the states,” but “RFRA’s strict scrutiny of the denial of religious
exemptions from general laws has continued to be applied to the
federal government.” 193
Following City of Boerne, the Supreme Court addressed
several cases pertaining to RFRA in the federal context—these
cases show the breadth of protection offered to religious objectors.
In Gonzales v. O Centro, 194 the Government sought to enforce the
Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) against members of a Christian
Spiritist sect to prohibit them from participating in the
communion practice of drinking a sacramental tea, consisting of
two plants with hallucinogenic properties.195 The sect moved for a
preliminary injunction, asserting a violation of RFRA. 196 Despite
the Government presenting evidence that the hallucinogens—
both Schedule I drugs—had “a high potential for abuse,” “no
currently accepted medical use in treatment,” and “a lack of
accepted safety for use . . . under medical supervision,” the Court

190 Id. at 532–33 (“[T]he statute . . . would require searching judicial scrutiny of
state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable
congressional intrusion into the Stats’ traditional prerogatives and general authority
to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.”).
191 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
192 Id. at 535 (“When the exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental
way by a law of general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have
been burdened any more than other citizens, let alone burdened because of their
religious beliefs.”).
193 NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 907 (19th
ed. 2016).
194 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
195 Id. at 423, 425 (2006).
196 Id. at 423.
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ruled in favor of the sect. 197 In reaching its decision, the Court
established that “RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted,
contemplate an inquiry more focused than the Government’s
categorical approach.
RFRA requires the government to
demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through
application of the law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant”
burdened by the law. 198 In support, the Court pointed to a
provision in the CSA, which allowed the Attorney General to
“waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers,
distributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public
health and safety,” and exemptions made by Congress for other
religious use. 199
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court addressed three
consolidated cases arising from a United States Department of
Health and Human Services (“HSS”) mandate, promulgated
under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), which required employers
with more than fifty full-time employees to offer twenty FDAapproved methods of contraception. 200 The three closely held
corporations involved challenged the mandate under RFRA,
claiming that they will be “facilitating abortions,” violative of their
religious principles, by providing health insurance coverage for
four of the contraceptives—which they considered to be
“abortifacients.” 201 The Court held in favor of the corporations,
finding that the regulation imposed a substantial burden on their
exercise of religion.202
Although the Court attempted to limit its holding, 203 the
Hobby Lobby decision was remarkably broad for several reasons.
First, it established that a for-profit, closely held corporation is a
“person,” capable of possessing sincerely held religious beliefs. 204
197
198
199

Id. at 430, 439.
Id. at 430–31 (emphasis added).
Id. at 432–33 (“[A]n exception has been made to the Schedule I ban for

religious use. For the past 35 years, there has been a regulatory exemption form use
of peyote—a Schedule I substance—by the Native American Church”) (citing 21
C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2005)).
200 573 U.S. 682, 683, 696 (2014).
201 Id. at 691 (stating that the business considered the contraceptive methods to
be “abortifacients”).
202
203
204

Id.
See id. at 692–93.
See id. at 707–12; but see Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518,

MORAN (DO NOT DELETE)

762

9/5/2022 11:47 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 46:3

A corporation, however, is a “fictional entity,” and is deemed
“legally distinct” from its owners for purposes of legal liability. 205
For Free Exercise purposes, on the other hand, owners may now
impute their beliefs to this separate entity while continuing to
benefit from the close corporation form. 206 Second, it would be a
mistake to overlook the breadth of the Hobby Lobby decision.
With more than 900 stores, over 43,000 employees, and operating
in forty-seven states, Hobby Lobby is no small organization. 207 Like
Hobby Lobby, “an overwhelming majority of U.S. corporations
incorporate as ‘closely held’ business,” 208 apparently all of which
are capable of exercising religion.
Further, the Hobby Lobby Court reaffirmed O Centro’s
“more focused inquiry” for RFRA claims, one that focuses on the
“application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.” 209 This subjective inquiry, determined by how the
belief is held by the claimant, opened the door for insincere claims
to go unchecked, 210 and enabled the Court to find a sufficient
religious burden where the employers simply “believed” the
contraceptives were abortifacients when, in fact, they were not. 211
636 (1819)
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect
the object for which it was created.
205 Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion is Not a Basis for Harming

Others: Review Essay of Paul A. Offit’s Bad Faith: When Religious Belief Undermines
Modern Medicine, 105 GA. L. J. 1111, 1133 (Sept. 1, 2015), https://escholarship.org/
content/qt0b39g9ds/qt0b39g9ds_noSplash_3e44cade5dc7eda9d779c328f868d226.p
df.
206
207

Id.
Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, https://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story

(last visited April 25, 2021).
208 Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 205, at 1133.
209 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 20000bb-1(b)) (emphasis
added).
210
Adams & Barmore, supra note 40, at 59 (“In the wake of the decision,
however, critics have expressed concern that future courts will be powerless to block
insincere RFRA claims brought by wholly secular corporations seeking to evade
generally applicable laws.”).
211 Hamilton, The Biggest Threat to Herd Immunity, supra note 37.
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Moreover, the Court disregarded evidence presented by HSS
suggesting that “the $2,000 per-employee penalty [for failing to
comply with the mandate was] actually less than the cost of
providing [the disputed] health insurance,” and therefore, the
employers could eliminate the “substantial burden” on their
religion while simultaneously reducing their financial burden—
making it difficult to accept the sincerity of the plaintiff’s claims. 212
The Court refused to entertain this argument, finding it difficult
to believe that Congress would place a family-run business in the
position of choosing between “violating their sincerely held
religious beliefs or making all of their employees lose their existing
healthcare plans.” 213
The final reason the Hobby Lobby decision proved substantial
was the resounding implication that religious rights are more
powerful than the interest of promoting public health. 214 In
applying the least restrictive means prong demanded by RFRA,
the majority pointed out that, instead of imposing a substantial
burden on the religious objectors, “the Government can assume
the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue.” 215 The
Court’s analysis on this issue implies that there will always be a less
restrictive alternative: “[T]he general public . . . can pick up the
tab.” 216
Following the Hobby Lobby decision, the Departments of
Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury
(“Departments”) amended the contraceptive mandate to include
religious and moral exemptions.217 In Little Sisters of the Poor v.
Pennsylvania, the states of New Jersey and Pennsylvania brought
suit, alleging that the Departments lacked the authority to include
such exemptions under both the ACA and RFRA. 218 The Court
found that the Departments had the authority to craft the
exceptions and remanded the consolidated cases. 219 In reaching
212
213
214
215
216

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 720–23.
Id. at 723.
See id. at 728–729.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 740 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

217 Little Sister of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct.
2367, 2373 (2020).
218 Id. at 2378.
219 Id. at 2386.
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its decision, the Court recognized that Hobby Lobby essentially
forced the federal government to develop a solution to the
formerly unlawful contraceptive mandate, and found it
appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA in doing so. 220
As exemplified by the former cases, RFRA is a major
frustration in the pursuit of herd immunity by way of mandatory
vaccination. 221 RFRA is strong medicine, and the “least-restrictive
means standard is exceptionally demanding.” 222 Justice Neil
Gorsuch referred to RFRA as a “super statute,” 223 which seems
fitting as the Act has elevated religious rights over public health.
Congress, however, left for itself a means to temper RFRA’s effects.
Embedded into the statute is a provision that states: “Federal
statutory law adopted after the date of the enactment of this
Act . . . is subject to this Act unless such law explicitly
excludes such application by reference to this Act.” 224 If Congress
were to issue a federal vaccine mandate, this “[r]ule of
construction” allows it to eliminate any RFRA concerns, once
again subjecting the mandate to Smith ’s neutral, generally
applicable standard.
B. The Alito Trilogy
For health purposes, any mandatory vaccination legislation
would need to include a secular exemption for “medical
contraindications”—i.e., “conditions in a recipient that increases
the risk for a serious adverse reaction.” 225 Some have adopted the
view that any exemption defeats Smith’s neutral, generally
applicable test, for it is no longer “generally applicable.” 226 Justice
Samuel Alito is an adherent of this view, and a line of opinions he
220
221

Id. at 2383.
Hamilton, The Biggest Threat to Herd Immunity, supra note 37.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014).
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (“RFRA operates as a
kind of super statute”).
224 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) (emphasis added).
225
Vaccine Recommendations and Guidelines of the ACIP, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 14, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/aciprecs/general-recs/contraindications.html.
226 See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
215 (2005) (“Religious groups . . . seized the theory that the Court must have meant
that any law creating an exception for one class off beneficiaries and not for religious
individuals . . . would be presumptively unconstitutional.”).
222
223
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authored (“The Alito Trilogy”) indicates how he might evaluate a
potential Free Exercise challenge to a vaccine mandate that only
includes a secular exemption for medical purposes.
In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 227 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed an internal
police department order that required officers to shave their
beards.228 Under this policy, the department made exemptions for
medical reasons (a skin condition called pseudo folliculitis barbae),
but refused to exempt officers “whose religious beliefs prohibit
them from shaving their beards.” 229 Two officers—both devout
Sunni Muslims—asserted that they were under a “religious
obligation” to grow their beards and sought permanent injunctive
relief from the department’s policy. 230 In an opinion authored by
then-Judge Alito, the Third Circuit concluded that the internal
policy violated the Free Exercise rights of the officers because the
department made secular exceptions but not religious
exceptions.231 In attempting to distinguish the department’s policy
from the law at issue in Smith, the court found that the decision to
provide a medical exemption undermined the department’s
asserted interest “in fostering a uniform appearance,” whereas the
medical exemption in Smith did not undermine the interest of
curbing the use of dangerous drugs.232
In Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 233 the Third Circuit addressed
a Free Exercise challenge to Pennsylvania’s wildlife permit
scheme, which required persons “wishing to keep wildlife in
captivity” to pay a fee in order to obtain an exotic wildlife
possession permit. 234 The statute excluded these requirements for
zoos and nationally recognized circuses and, additionally, allowed
for the Game Commission to authorize waiver of such payment
227
228
229
230
231

170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).

Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 360, 366 (“[T]he medical exemption raises concern because it indicates

that the Department has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical)
motivations for wearing a bear are important enough to overcome its general interest
in uniformity but that religious motivations are not.”).
232 Id. at 366.
233 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004).
234 Id. at 205.
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“where hardship or extraordinary circumstances warrant[],” so
long as the waiver is “consistent with sound game or wildlife
management activities or the interest of the Game and Wildlife
Code.” 235 Blackhawk, a follower of the religious traditions of the
Lakota Indians, sought an exemption from the permit fee “on the
ground that he possessed . . . bears for Native American religious
purposes” 236 When his permit waiver was denied, Blackhawk
challenged the permit provision, claiming that the Commission’s
waiver policies violated the Free Exercise Clause. 237 Then-Judge
Alito agreed, finding that Pennsylvania’s wildlife permit scheme
was not neutral and generally applicable in that the scheme
“feature[d] both individualized and categorial secular
exemptions,” triggering the application of strict scrutiny. 238
Because the state permitted certain secular exemptions, the Third
Circuit found “no plausible ground” for the differential treatment
of religious purposes, ultimately ruling in favor of Blackhawk. 239
After being appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice Alito
continued to adhere to the idea that any exemption defeats
Smith’s neutral, generally applicable standard but, this time, it
came by way of a scathing dissent following the denial of certiorari
in a case from the Ninth Circuit. 240 In Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman,
the Washington State Pharmacy Board adopted two rules to
combat instances of pharmacies referring customers to other,
nearby pharmacies to fill prescriptions for emergency
contraceptives, such as Plan B, because the pharmacy’s religious
beliefs “require[d]” them to avoid stocking such drugs. 241 These
rules, known as the Delivery Rule and the Pharmacist
Responsibility Rule, did not require any individual pharmacist to
dispense medication; rather, they placed the burden on the
235
236
237
238

Id.
Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 212.

Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2004).
Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 2433, 2433 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (finding that “[t]his case is an ominous
sign” and that “this Court does not deem the case worthy of our time. If this is a sign
of how religious liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who value
religious freedom have cause for great concern.”).
241 Id. at 2434.
239
240
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pharmacies to “deliver lawfully prescribed drugs or devices to
patients and to distribute drugs and devices approved by the FDA
for restricted distribution by pharmacies.” 242 The new rules worked
in tandem with the existing Stocking Rule, which required
pharmacies to stock “a representative assortment of drugs in order
to meet the pharmaceutical needs of its patients.” 243 The Delivery
Rule, however, embraced a number of secular exemptions; most
importantly, it included a broad payment exception: “a pharmacy
is not required to deliver a drug without payment of its usual and
customary or contracted charge.” 244 Moreover, the trial court
found that “there [were also] many unwritten exceptions” to the
rules. 245 The pharmacies argued that the board’s regulations
violated the Free Exercise Clause because they believed that, by
providing such contraceptives, they would become complicit in
“taking a life,” which was against their Christian values. 246 Justice
Alito agreed and, in his dissent, found that, by allowing for secular
but not religious refusals, the regulations “devalue[d] religious
reasons” for declining to dispense medication,” and judged them
to be “of lesser importance than nonreligious reasons.” 247 In
Justice Alito’s opinion, the board’s regulations were not neutral
and generally applicable, and he would have subjected the
regulations to strict scrutiny review. 248
Most recently, in an address to the Federalist Society, Justice
Samuel Alito stated that “for many today, religious liberty is not a
cherished freedom.” 249 This Comment takes issue with that
assessment. As stated above, the United States is a haven for
believers, but also a place where believers do not have a
constitutional right to harm others.250 In recognition of that
242
243
244
245

Id. at 2435–36.
Id. at 2436.
See id.
Id. at 2436, 2437–38 (“a pharmacy may decline to stock a drug because the

drug requires additional paperwork or patient monitoring, has a short shelf life, may
attract crime, requires simple compounding, or falls outside the pharmacy’s niche.”).
246 Stormans, 136 S. Ct. at 2433–34 (Alito, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 2438.
248 Id. at 2440.
249
The Federalist Society, Address by Justice Samuel Alito [2020 National
Lawyers Convention], YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=VMnukCVIZWQ.
250 Hamilton, In Defense of Justice Scalia on Religious Liberty and Smith, supra
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principle, it is equally important to realize that not all exemptions
are created equal; when it comes to public health laws, medical
exemptions reign supreme. Importantly, the fact that the Oregon
law at issue in Smith prohibited the “knowing or intentional
possession of a controlled substance unless the substance has been
prescribed by a medical practitioner” goes underappreciated. 251
By upholding that law against a Free Exercise challenge, 252 the
Supreme Court implicitly recognized the notion of medical
superiority in the realm of exemptions to public health laws.
C. A “Most Favored Nation”?
On February 24, 2020, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, a case where petitioners sought
to either: (1) overrule Smith; or (2) “sharply limit the impact of
Smith by turning a caveat the Smith majority used to distinguish a
prior case—the ‘mechanism for individualized exemptions’
reading of [Sherbert]—into a broader ‘most favored nation’
approach to religious-exemption claims.” 253 The “most favored
nation” theory suggests that a law loses neutral, generally
applicable status under Smith “if it contains any exemptions that
are deemed ‘comparable’ to the requested religious exemption,” 254
a theory Justice Alito seemed to approve. Therefore, the existence
of any exemption for “favored activity” automatically presumes a
right for a religious exemption, which can only be denied by
satisfying strict scrutiny.255
While the Fulton decision was looming, the COVID-19
pandemic began to dominate the U.S., leading many states to issue
orders that limited group gatherings in an effort to slow
transmission.256 Among the groups affected by these orders were
churches, some of which brought Free Exercise challenges to these
note 159.
251
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (199)
(emphasis added).
252 Id. at 890.
253
Jim Oleske, Fulton Quiets Tandon’s Thunder: A Free Exercise Puzzle,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 18, 2021) [hereinafter Oleske, Fulton Quiets Tandon’s Thunder].
254 Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50.
255 Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50.
256 Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50.
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gathering limits.257 Specifically, these churches “contended that
they had a right to be exempted from size limits on gatherings
because those same limits were not applied to limit the number of
people who could be present in what they described as ‘favored’
business establishments (e.g., retail stores, manufacturing
facilities).” 258 Several of these limitation challenges reached the
Supreme Court in the form of emergency application for
injunctive relief on the Court’s “shadow docket.” 259
One such case was Tandon v. Newsom,260 where—in a short
per curiam opinion—the majority, joined by Justice Barrett, held
that:
government regulations are not neutral and
generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, whenever
they treat any comparable secular activity more
favorably than religious exercise. It is no answer that
a State treats some comparable secular business or
other activities as poorly or even less favorably than
the religious exercise at issue.261
For the first time, the Court seemed to fully embrace the most
favored nation theory as the governing standard. 262 Applying this
theory, the majority found that religious in-home gatherings must
be exempt from California’s COVID restrictions, which applied
equal household limits to both secular and religious in-home
gatherings because the same limitation did not apply to various
businesses. 263
In dissent, Justice Kagan argued that “[t]he Free Exercise
Clause requires that a States treat religious conduct as well as
comparable secular conduct.” 264 Recognizing that some cases may
Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50.
Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50.
259 Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50; see discussion, supra
pp. 11–13.
260 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021).
261 Id. at 1296 (emphasis added).
262 Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50.
263 Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1297.
264 Id. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
257
258

MORAN (DO NOT DELETE)

770

9/5/2022 11:47 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 46:3

provide difficulties in finding the right secular analog, no such
problem was present in Tandon. 265 California limited all in-home
gatherings to three households, secular and religious. 266
Therefore, by insisting that in-home religious gatherings be
treated as well as hardware stores and hair salons, and not as the
obvious comparator—in-home secular gatherings—the Court
required states to cast an expansive comparative net so as to
“equally treat apples and watermelons.” 267 Moreover, the majority
defied the factual record, suggesting that “‘the Ninth Circuit did
not conclude that’ activities like frequenting stores or sales ‘pose a
lesser risk of transmission’ than . . . at-home religious activities.” 268
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit did find three reasons that those
activities posed a lesser risk: (1) “when people gather in social
settings, their interactions are likely to be longer than they would
be in a commercial setting,” (2) “private houses are typically
smaller and less ventilated than commercial establishments,” and
(3) “social distancing and mask-wearing are less likely in private
settings and enforcement is more difficult.” 269
With Tandon seeming to resolve the issues for consideration
by the Court in Fulton—seemingly declaring the most favored
nation approach as the law of the land—it led some to characterize
the decision as “stealing Fulton’s thunder.” 270
That
characterization, however, proved to be a misnomer, as the Fulton
decision quelled much of that thunder.
D. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia
In Fulton, the City of Philadelphia’s Department of Human
Services (“Department”) ceased referring children to Catholic
Social Services (“CSS”) after discovering that the agency would
refuse to certify same-sex couples as foster parents because of its
belief that “marriage is a sacred bond between a man and a
woman.” 271 In support of the City’s decision, it explained that, by
265
266
267
268
269
270
271

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder, supra note 50.

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (2021).
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refusing to certify same-sex couples, CSS was in violation of a nondiscrimination provision in the foster care contract agreed to by
CSS.272 The non-discrimination provision relied on by the City
stated, in relevant part: “Provider shall not reject a child or family
including, but not limited to . . . prospective foster or adoptive
parents, for Services based upon . . . their . . . sexual
orientation . . . unless an exception is granted by the
Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee, in his/her sole
discretion .”273 CSS filed suit, alleging that the City’s referral
freeze violated the Free Exercise Clause.274 In reaching its
decision, the Court seemingly “sidestep[ed]” the issues for which
it granted certiorari,275 instead, opting to decide the case on much
narrower grounds. Ultimately, the majority held for CSS,
finding that the contractual non-discrimination requirement
was not generally applicable because it included “a mechanism
for individualized exemptions,” in that it made exemptions
available at the “sole discretion” of the Commissioner,276
artfully relying on dicta from Smith which first suggested the
prohibition against such state-created mechanisms. In applying
strict scrutiny, the Court analyzed the City’s three asserted
interests: “maximizing the number of foster parents,
protecting the City from liability, and ensuring equal treatment of
prospective foster parents and foster children.”277
The
Court reframed the question as, “not whether the City has a
compelling interest in enforcing its non-discrimination policies
generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an
exception to CSS,”278 essentially adopting O Centro ’s “to the
person” approach for Free Exercise challenges.
After
narrowing the scope of the City’s formulated interests, the
Court found that the City failed to establish a compelling
interest for denying CSS an exemption while continuing to
make secular exceptions for others.279
272
273
274
275
276

Id. at 1875.
Id. at 1878 (emphases added).
Id. at 1876.
Id. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. 1877–78 (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.

872, 884 (1990)).
277 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881.
278
279

Id.
Id. 1882.
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The Fulton majority provided no additional guidance on the
most favored nation approach taken in Tandon—failing to even
mention the case. 280
Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s Fulton
concurrence, however, may prove the most consequential of the
four opinions authored. 281 In the leadup to Fulton, many
wondered how Justice Barrett would rule: on one hand, Justice
Barrett’s devout Catholic faith is widely reported—a topic of public
debate stemming from her Supreme Court nomination. 282 That
fact is further compounded by Justice Barrett’s resume, which
makes her one of the most conservative justices since Clarence
Thomas. 283 On the other hand, however, Justice Barrett clerked
for Justice Scalia, 284 the author of the Smith decision, and has been
quoted as saying “his judicial philosophy is mine, too.” 285 Although
Justice Barrett never reached the issue of Smith’s legitimacy going
forward, her concurrence did, however, provide skepticism in
adopting a categorical strict scrutiny regime. 286 Instead, Justice
Barrett suggested a “more nuanced” approach, one informed by
“other First Amendment” doctrines. 287

Oleske, Fulton Quiets Tandon’s Thunder, supra note 253 (noting that shift
away from the most favored nation approach seemingly adopted in Tandon may stem
from the fact that Tandon was decided on the Court’s “shadow docket,” so the
Justices “did not have the benefit of full briefing or oral argument.”).
281 Oleske, Fulton Quiets Tandon’s Thunder, supra note 253.
282 Thomas B. Griffith, Amy Coney Barrett’s Religion Won’t Dictate Her Rulings,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/—opinion—/—
articles/2020-10-12/amy-coney-barrett-s-religion-won-t-dictate-her-rulings?sref=—
voktyKaT (quoting Justice Barrett as saying that a judge should “never” impose her
“personal convictions, whether they derive from faith or anywhere else, on the law.”).
283 Greg Stohr et al., Barrett Could Be Most Conservative Justice Since Clarence
Thomas, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/—
news/articles/2020-09-26/barrett-could-be-most-conservative-justice-since-clarencethomas.
284 Mark Satta, Amy Coney Barrett Sizes Up 30-Year-Old Precedent Balancing
Religious Freedom with Rule of Law, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 13, 2020, 8:40 AM),
https://theconversation.com/amy-coney-barrett-sizes-up-30-year-old-precedentbalancing-religious-freedom-with-rule-of-law-149600.
285 Marcia Coyle, ‘His Judicial Philosophy is Mine’: Amy Barrett Touts Scalia in
Remarks from Rose Garden, NAT’L L. J. (Sept. 26, 2020, 5:27 PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2020/09/26/his-judicial-philosophy-is-mineamy-barrett-touts-scalia-in-remarks-from-rose-garden/.
286
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021) (Barrett, J.,
concurring).
280

287

See id.
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Moreover, in light of the “Alito Trilogy,” 288 and the fact that
Justice Alito joined the majority in Tandon, one might assume—
incorrectly—that he would have advocated on behalf of the most
favored nation approach. Again, with no mention of Tandon,
Justice Alito’s seventy-seven-page concurrence raised doubts about
the administrability of such an approach—pointing to the
“confusion” among the lower courts in determining appropriate
“comparators” for places of worship. 289
The Fulton decision can be properly characterized as a near
miss; however, Fulton may be broader than it first appears. The
immediate effects are two-fold: First, welfare agencies in
Philadelphia may now constitutionally refuse to certify LGBTQ
couples as foster families; second, agencies that once agreed to the
City’s non-discrimination provision may now seek the same
exemption as CSS. 290
Further, the secondary effects of Fulton have yet to be seen;
however, recent activity by similarly situated foster care programs
points to some of the ripple effects to come:
[T]he Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston is seeking
to enter the foster care business, but only if
exempted from antidiscrimination rules. Miracle
Hill Ministries is facing lawsuits for turning away
families because they were Catholic, Jewish, or gay.
The litigants may point to the Department of Health
and Human Services’ ability to grant waivers from
child welfare funding requirements as proof of
individualized exemptions. 291
E. The Smith Standard & Vaccine Mandates
Now that the smoke has cleared, it seems as though the most
favored nation approach is off the table, at least for now, and Smith
remains intact. With a more robust Free Exercise jurisprudence
seemingly on the horizon, however, it is time to recognize the
288
289
290
291

See discussion, supra Part V.B and accompanying text.
Oleske, Fulton Quiets Tandon’s Thunder, supra note 253.
Sepper & Nelson, supra note 52.
Id.
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superiority of Smith’s rational basis standard—that being: “We all
benefit from neutral and general laws, just as those adjectives
suggest.” 292
Under current Free Exercise jurisprudence, individuals have
no right to a religious exemption from neutral and generally
applicable laws unless there is also a secular exception, or gap in
coverage, which undermines the government’s interest equally. 293
If the law includes no such secular exception, the government does
not have to provide a reason for refusing religious exemptions. 294
Any compulsory vaccination legislation, however, would
necessarily need to include a secular exemption for medical
contraindications. Medical exemptions in these circumstances are
different than, for example, the policy at issue in Fraternal Order
of Police. There, the department’s decision to provide a medical
exemption undermined its stated interest of fostering a uniform
appearance. In the vaccine context, medical exemptions “[do not]
undermine the government’s interest in saving lives, preventing
serious illness[,] or preserving hospital capacity.” 295 Therefore,
medical exemption from vaccine legislation is more analogous to
Smith, where the Court reasoned that a medical exception for
doctor-prescribed controlled substances did not undermine the
state’s interest in curbing the use of dangerous drugs. In fact, by
avoiding medical complications caused by vaccination, such
exemptions actually further the government’s interest in public
health. 296 Therefore, Smith is the proper standard by which any
Free Exercise challenge to vaccine legislation should be
adjudicated.
Even under Sherbert’s strict scrutiny standard, however, “the
government has a compelling interest in preventing significant
threats to other people’s health, especially so in a pandemic.” 297 In
fact, when it comes to compulsory vaccination against infectious
disease, the government’s case to refuse a religious exemption is

292
293
294
295
296
297

Griffin & Hamilton, supra note 51.
Laycock, supra note 26.
Laycock, supra note 26.
Laycock, supra note 26.
Laycock, supra note 26.
Laycock, supra note 26.
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quite clear. 298 Unvaccinated individuals pose a unique threat to
those who are immunocompromised and those who cannot be
vaccinated due to their age or underlying medical conditions. 299
Moreover, the unvaccinated similarly endanger vaccinated
individuals “because no vaccination is 100% effective, as is evident
from the number of breakthrough COVID-19 infections in the
U.S.” 300 In sum, the general idea is that the government has a
“compelling interest in not having a general policy’s effectiveness
undermined by” religious objectors.
Justice Scalia recognized just as much in Smith, stating that,
in a society “made up of people of almost every conceivable
religious preference,” 301 the government would be required to
grant religious exemption from “civic obligations of almost every”
kind, ranging from:
[C]ompulsory military service, to payment of taxes,
to health and safety regulation such as
manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory
vaccination laws, drug laws . . . traffic laws, to social
welfare legislation, such as minimum wages laws,
child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental
protection laws, and laws providing for equality of
opportunity for the races. 302
The First Amendment does not give carte blanche to believers to
the detriment of others and strict adherence to Smith’s neutral,
generally applicable standard is essential for upholding that
principle.

Laycock, supra note 26.
Laycock, supra note 26.
300 Laycock, supra note 26.
301
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)
(citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
302 Id. at 888–89 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
298
299
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VI. CONCLUSION

Public health laws are often in tension with individual
freedoms. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion,
provided for in the Constitution, is not absolute. In a civil society,
such as ours, it is inherent in its design that individuals sacrifice a
reasonable amount of freedom to ensure the safety of our
community, as a whole. Quite possibly the most important
component of this communal safety—public health—is dependent
on the collective fulfillment of civil duties and obligations, such as
vaccination, which provides for societal conditions that further the
general wellness of our population.
As vaccine mandates—and religious objections to such
government action—look poised to grow, the government’s
interest in maintaining public health will continue to be put to the
test. However, in times of public crisis, such as the COVID-19
pandemic, it is imperative that the Supreme Court continues to
recognize the government’s paramount interest in public health
and safety.

